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Most models currently used to determine optimal foreign reserve holdings take the level of 
international debt as given. However, given the sovereign’s willingness-to-pay incentive problems, reserve 
accumulation may reduce sustainable debt levels. In addition, assuming constant debt levels does not allow 
addressing one of the puzzles behind using reserves as a means to avoid the negative effects of crisis: why 
do not sovereign countries reduce their sovereign debt instead? To study the joint decision of holding 
sovereign debt and reserves, we construct a stochastic dynamic equilibrium model calibrated to a sample of 
emerging markets. We obtain that the optimal policy is not to hold reserves at all. This finding is robust to 
considering interest rate shocks, sudden stops, contingent reserves and reserve dependent output costs.  
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1   Introduction 
  There is a renewed interest in policy and academic circles about the optimal level of foreign 
reserves sovereign countries should hold. This recent interest follows the rapid rise in international reserves 
held by developing countries. In 2005, for example, reserve accumulation amounted to 20% of GDP in low- 
and middle-income countries; whereas this number was close to 5% in high-income countries. This practice 
has raised interesting questions in the literature regarding the cost and benefits of reserve accumulation. The 
cost of holding reserves has been estimated at close to 1% of GDP for all developing countries (Rodrik 
2006).
1 Against this cost, an explanation commonly advanced is that countries may have accumulated 
reserves as an insurance mechanism against the risk of an external crisis—self protection through increased 
liquidity.
2  
  Recently, researchers have undertaken the task of writing analytical models to characterize and 
quantify the optimal level of reserves and provide policy advice to countries.
3 Most of the formal models 
used in the current analysis tend to take the level of international debt as given and solve for the optimal 
liquidity-insurance services that reserves can provide. In other words, the literature has set aside the joint 
decision of holding sovereign debt and reserves. Although this strategy has allowed for a better 
understanding of the interplay between foreign reserves and a sovereign’s access to international markets, 
there are several concerns with this approach. First, some of the implications of this assumption may not be 
generalized once one considers the joint decision by a sovereign to hold foreign debt and reserves. For 
example, in models a la Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), international debt serves an “insurance” role. That is, 
the demand for international loans derives from a desire to smooth consumption. Hence, given the 
sovereign’s willingness-to-pay incentive problems, additional reserves in this type of models tend to reduce 
sustainable debt levels.
4  Second, the strategy of assuming constant debt levels does not address one of the 
                                                 
1 Rodrik (2006) estimates the cost of reserves as the spread between the private sector’s cost of short-term borrowing 
abroad and the yield the Central Bank earns on its liquid foreign assets.   
2 For policy advice in this direction, see Feldstein (1999) and Caballero (2003). The “Greensan-Guidotti-IMF” rule 
proposes full coverage of short-term external liabilities to mitigate the risk of currency crises.  
3 See for example Aizenman and Lee (2005), Caballero and Panageas (2004), Jeanne (2007), Jeanne and Ranciere 
(2006), Lee (2004). 
4 In this type of model, the cost to a sovereign of the denial of foreign credit is that the country must resort to other 
methods for consumption smoothing (such as building stock piles) or it must accept a greater fluctuation in its 
consumption. This penalty and hence the sustainable levels of foreign debt are higher the greater the cost to the   3
puzzles behind the current accumulation of reserves. Sovereign countries have an alternative way of 
reducing the probability and negative effects of external crisis: to reduce the level of sovereign debt. That is, 
even in the case where reserve accumulation has positive liquidity benefits in terms of reducing the 
probability of suffering financial crises and the output costs associated with it, a similar net asset position 
can be obtained by reducing instead the level of foreign debt.
5   
  In this paper, we address these concerns by incorporating debt sustainability issues into the optimal 
reserve management analysis. Our main objective is to study the implications of the joint decision of 
holding sovereign debt and reserves.  We construct a stochastic dynamic equilibrium model of a small open 
economy with non contingent debt and reserve assets. Our starting setup is a model a la Eaton-Gersovitz and 
similar to Arellano (2006) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), but where the sovereign has the choice to hold 
reserves.  We assess the quantitative implication of the model by calibrating a sample of emerging markets. 
A robust result that emerges from our numerical exercises is that the optimal policy is not to accumulate 
reserves.  
  We extend the model in several ways. Most of the recent papers advancing the insurance motive 
behind reserve accumulation have been motivated by the sudden loss of access to international capital 
markets and the collapse of domestic production which have characterized the emerging markets crises of 
the nineties—a phenomenon Calvo (1998) labeled as “sudden stops.”
6 In line with the sudden stops 
literature, most of the formal analysis studying optimal reserve management  model reserve accumulation as 
a cushion against external shocks and capital flows reversals while the level of international debt is taken as 
given. That is, in these models countries engage in reserve accumulation to seek self-insurance against the 
potential tightening of international financial constraints rather than income fluctuation per se as in more 
standard debt models. These models have made important progress in providing an integral framework to 
analyze quantitatively some of the limitations and risks of the integration of developing countries to 
                                                                                                                                                                 
borrower of exclusion. This cost in turn is higher the more limited domestically available options for smoothing 
consumption are and the lower the cost of smoothing via the international capital markets is (i.e. the lower the world 
interest rate). See Eaton et al. (1986). 
5 Rodrik (2006) mentions that countries could choose instead to reduce short-term debt in order to gain liquidity. More 
generally, countries can reduce foreign debt.  
6 Additional empirical regularities include the sharp contractions in domestic production and consumption and the 
collapse of the real exchange rate and asset prices. See Arellano and Mendoza (2003) and Edwards (2004) for 
overviews of the stylized facts and the literature studying the “sudden stops” phenomena.    4
international financial markets.
7 But by taking the level of debt as given, they have abstracted from 
willingness-to-pay concerns associated with sovereign debt and the sovereign’s choice over the composition 
of its assets and liabilities. 
  In order to analyze the interplay of both effects, we study an economy that is (i) hit by random 
shocks in the interest rate (which we take to be “contagion shocks”), and (ii) in addition to the interest rate 
shocks, the economy faces additional output costs associated with abrupt current account reversals (which 
we take to mean “sudden stops”).   However, as mentioned, our model retains willingness-to-pay concerns. 
Note that since we focus on debt and reserve management problems, in this paper we do not attempt to 
advance the understanding of the contagion or sudden stops phenomena.
8 Instead we incorporate them into 
the analysis in a highly stylized form.
 Our approach, nevertheless, reveals interesting results. Once again the 
optimal policy does not involve accumulating reserves. Rather, the government reacts by reducing the 
amount of outstanding debt. Moreover, these results are robust to the possibility of holding contingent 
reserves, which, as suggested by Caballero and Panageas (2005), are a more efficient device to insulate the 
country from sudden stops.  
  We then study the role of output costs. The sovereign debt literature has found output costs to play 
an important quantitative role even in models where debt should otherwise be sustainable (see Alfaro and 
Kanczuk (2005)). Although these output losses are well documented, their micro-foundation remains to be 
understood.
9 Nevertheless, some empirical evidence suggests that reserves may reduce the output costs 
associated with sudden stops (see Frankel and Cavallo (2004)). In order to incorporate these stylized facts in 
our analysis, we consider a case where foreign reserves reduce output costs exogenously. Interestingly, in 
this case, if reserves reduce output costs, they reduce sustainability. For this reason, we obtain once again 
that it is optimal not to hold reserves. 
                                                 
7  See for example Caballero and Panageas (2004). Estimates by Rodrik (2006) and Jeanne and Ranciere (2006) find 
reserves holdings to be consistent with a government’s desire to insure against the probability and cost of currency 
crises. Lee (2004) quantifies the insurance value of reserves.  
8 See Mendoza (2004) for important work on this direction. As the author explains, the economics behind sudden stops 
remains to be understood. The standard real business cycle models do not seem to account for the main stylized facts of 
these events. Durdu, Mendoza and Terrones (2007) quantitatively analyze the role of foreign reserves in a model of 
incomplete asset markets in which precautionary saving affects asset holding via business cycle volatility, financial 
globalization and sovereign risk.  
9 See Dooley (2000) and Calvo (2000) for theoretical explanations.    5
  The main implication that emerges from our work is that greater attention should be given to the 
explicit modeling of additional constraints limiting the sovereign’s ability to reduce debt levels (or more 
generally political economy rationales) as they seem necessary towards the understanding of the observed 
levels of foreign reserve holdings. To be sure, scholars have considered additional motives for holding 
reserves. In an earlier literature, reserve holdings were associated with exchange rate management policies.
10 
More recently, it has been argued that the rapid rise in reserves has little to do with self insurance, but 
instead with the policymaker’s desire to prevent the appreciation of the currency and maintain the 
competitiveness of the exporting sector (the mercantilist view by Dooley et al. (2003)).
11  Yet, another 
strand of the literature has considered political economy issues. Aizenman and Marion (2003), for example, 
analyze the role of interest groups, corruption and opportunistic behavior by future policy makers. In their 
setup, a policy recommendation to increase international reserve holdings may be welfare reducing as it may 
increase the chance of a financial crisis. More generally, our work suggests that policy recommendations 
may differ from the consensus once sovereign debt issues are considered. This, is in line with Rogoff`s 
(1999) critical remark: “Whereas the debate over why countries repay may seem rather philosophical, it is 
quite dangerous to think about grand plans to restructure the world financial system without having a 
concrete view on it.” 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model. Section 3 
defines the data and calibration. The results are discussed in section 4, which is complemented by a 
comment about the role of reserves as collateral. Section 5 concludes.  
2  Model 
  Our economy is populated by a sovereign country that borrows funds from a continuum of 
international risk-neutral investors. The economy faces uncertainty in output. As preferences are concave in 
consumption, households prefer a smooth consumption profile. In order to smooth consumption, the 
benevolent government may choose optimally to default on its international commitments. As in Arellano 
                                                 
10 See Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981), Edwards (1983) and Aizenman (2005) and Flood and Marion (2002) for recent 
reviews of the literature. 
11 See Aizenman and Lee (2005) for a test of the importance of precautionary and mercantilist motives in accounting 
for the hoarding of international reserves by developing countries.   6
(2006) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), if the government defaults on its debts, it is assumed to be 
temporarily excluded from borrowing in the international markets. The novelty of our model is that the 
government has available another device to smooth consumption: in addition to issuing debt, the 
government can hold international reserves. And even when the government is excluded from borrowing 
international funds, a reserve buffer can be used to reduce consumption volatility. 





















where σ > 0 measures the curvature of the utility, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and ct denotes household 
consumption. 
If the government chooses to repay its debt, the country’s budget constraint is given by 
  11 exp( ) ( ) ( )
BR
tt t t t t t t cz B q B R q R ++ =− −+ − (2) 
where Bt denotes the debt level in period t, Rt denotes the reserve level in period t, and zt is the technology 




are endogenously determined in the model, and potentially depend on all the states of the economy, st, 
which will be described in each of the different scenarios we study. In the benchmark version of the model, 
the state of the economy is completely defined by the ordered set st = (Bt, Rt, zt). 
We assume the technology state zt can take a finite number of values and evolves over time 
according to a Markov transition matrix with elements π (zi , zj ). That is, the probability that zt +1 = zj given 
that zt = zi is given by the matrix π element of row i and column j. 
When the government chooses to default, the economy’s constraint is 
  1 (1 )exp( ) ( )
R
tt t t t cz R q R + =− δ + −  (3) 
where the parameter δ governs the additional loss of output in autarky, a common feature in sovereign debt 
models (see Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005a)). After defaulting, the sovereign is temporarily excluded from   7
issuing debt. In particular, we assume that θ is the probability that it regains full access to the international 
credit markets. 
To grasp some intuition, consider a sovereign’s choice to default, and compare expressions (2) and 
(3). On the one hand, defaulting entails an instantaneous reduction in the costs of rolling debt. This means 
higher consumption, particularly when the debt service is large. On the other hand, defaulting implies a 
lower output, and a reduction in the possibilities of smoothing consumption in future periods. This is 
because the sovereign loses access to credit markets. Reserves should have a role in such circumstances, 
because they allow for some consumption smoothing even when the sovereign cannot issue debt. 
International investors are risk neutral and have an opportunity cost of funds given by ρt, which 
denotes the risk-free rate. The investors’ actions are to choose the debt price 
B
t q  which depends on the 
perceived likelihood of default, and the reserves price 
R
t q . 





















 (5)   
where ψt is the probability of default, which is endogenously determined and depends on the sovereign 
incentives to repay debt. 
The timing of the decisions is as follows. In the beginning of each period, the sovereign starts with 
debt level Bt and reserve levels Rt, and receives the endowment exp(zt). She faces the reserve price schedule, 
) ( t
R
t s q , and the bond price schedule  ) ( t
B
t s q . Taking these two schedules as given, the sovereign 
simultaneously makes three decisions: (i) she chooses the next level of reserves, Rt+1; (ii) she decides 
whether to default on her debt or not; and (iii) if she decides not to default, she chooses the next level of 
debt, Bt+1.   8
The model described is a stochastic dynamic game. We focus exclusively on the Markov perfect 
equilibria. In these equilibria, the sovereign does not have commitment, and players act sequentially and 
rationally. 
In order to describe the equilibrium, notice first that the international investors are passive, and their 
actions can be completely described by equations (4) and (5). In order to write the sovereign problem 
recursively, let ν
G denote the value function of the sovereign if she decides to maintain a good credit history 
this period (G stands for bad credit history). Similarly let ν
B denote the value function of the sovereign once 
it defaults (B stands for bad credit history). The value of being in a good credit standing at the start of a 
period can then be defined as, 
 {,}
GB vM a x vv =  (6) 
  This indicates that the sovereign defaults if ν
G < ν
B.  The value functions ν
G can be written as, 
  1 () { () ( ) }
G
tt t vs M a x u c E v s + =+ β  (7) 
subject to (2), and the value function ν
B by 
  11 () { () [ ( )( 1 ) ( ) ] }
BG B
tt t t vs M a x u c E vs E vs ++ =+ β θ + − θ  (8) 
subject to (3). 
  To compute the equilibrium, it is useful to define a default set as the states of the economy in which 
the sovereign chooses to default. The default set in turn determines the prices q
B and q
R, through expressions 
(4) and (5). With these prices at hand, one can solve the sovereign problem (6), (7), and (8). The solution for 
(7) determines a default, which can be used in the next iteration. 
3  Calibration 
We calibrate our model so that each period corresponded to one year. Our list of 28 emerging 
economies is composed of those countries classified as such by The Economist.
12 We use available data 
                                                 
12 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, 
South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Turkey, Venezuela.   9
since 1965. To calibrate the technology state z, we estimate an AR(1) process for the (logarithm) of the GDP 
for each country i, that is, 
  ,1 , ,1 ln( ) ln( ) it i it it yy ++ =α +ε , where  , (0, ) it i N ε ε ≈σ  
We obtain that the GDP weighted average (across countries) parameters are α = 0.85 and σε = 
0.044, and the dispersion around these values is fairly small. We then assume the technology state can be 
discretized into three possible values, z
low, z
avg and z
high. They are spaced so that the extreme values are 2.5 
standard deviations away from the mean. We use the Quadrature Method (Tauchen, 1986) to calculate the 
transition probabilities. We also discretized the space state of debt and reserves, assuming they could take 
values from zero to 60% of GDP. We assumed these grids were large and fine enough not to affect the 
decision rules. 
We set the probability of redemption θ = 0.5, which implies an average stay in autarky of 2 years, in 
line with the estimates by Gelos et al. (2003). In the benchmark case, the output cost is set equal to δ = 10%, 
but we experiment with other values as well, δ = 5% and δ = 20% as in Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005a).
13 
Following the Real Business Cycle literature, we can calibrate the parameter of preference curvature σ = 2 
and the risk free rate ρ = 0.04, which corresponds to the U.S. interest rate. As Arellano (2006) and Aguiar 
and Gopinath (2006) note, high impatience is necessary for generating reasonable default in equilibrium. 
Correspondingly we set the time preference factor equal to β = 0.50. A summary of the calibration 
parameters is found in Table 1. 
4 Results 
4.1 The Model with No Reserves 
In order to compare our results with the literature, we first solve for an economy without reserves. 
That is, we assume that Rt = 0 for any t, and solve, given the state, for the optimal default choice and for the 
optimal level of debt. In this simple case, the state of the economy is completely defined by the asset level 
and the technology, st = (Bt, zt). 
                                                 
13 Note that for lower values of δ, the model can sustain very low debt levels relative to the stylized facts.   10
Figures 1a and 1b depict, respectively, the sovereign’s default decision and the choice of the next 
period debt level contingent on the sovereign not defaulting during this period. The curve denoted by “base” 
refers to the most favorable situation: one where the sovereign is hit by the high technology shock, z
high. The 
curve denoted by “low technology” refers to the case where the sovereign suffers a bad technology shock, 
z
low.  
Figure 1a indicates that when the technology shock is high (“base”) the sovereign defaults when the 
debt level is higher than 50.5% of GDP. If the technology shock is low (“low technology”), the maximum 
amount of sustainable debt is 41.1%. Since, as expected, default is used as a means to smooth consumption, 
default is more likely the lower the output levels. 
Figure 1b shows that the next period debt level is higher the better the technology state and the 
higher this period debt. The positive relationship between consecutive debt levels was anticipated because, 
for a given technology shock, the sovereign would attempt to avoid sharp changes in the level of debt as 
these imply higher consumption volatility. The positive relationship between technology and debt is a fairly 
surprising result, although already discussed by other researchers (see Arellano (2006)). It means that the 
sovereign does not use debt primarily as a way to smooth consumption, a departure from the “pure” Eaton 
and Gersovitz (1981) framework. Instead, debt is predominantly used to front-load consumption, given that 
the discount factor β is lower than the inverse of the risk free interest rate. As mentioned, consumption 
smoothing is mostly achieved through default, as in contingent debt service models, such as Grossman and 
Van Huyck (1988). 
Calculating the invariant distribution of the states, we determine that the sovereign is excluded from 
the market 1.29% of the time, and the average debt is 46.0% of output, as reported in Table 2. These results 
are broadly consistent with the stylized facts.  
4.2 The Role of Reserves 
  In our benchmark model, we allow the sovereign to hold reserves. The state of the economy is 
defined by st = (Bt, Rt, zt). We solve again for the equilibrium and obtain the optimal choices of defaulting, 
holding of debt, and reserves, which are reported in figures 2a to 2d. These figures contain 3 curves each. As   11
before, we report the decision rules for the cases named “base” and “low technology,” which refer 
respectively to situations with good and bad technology shock, and reserves kept equal to zero (Rt = 0). But, 
in addition, these figures report the decision rule for the case named “high reserves,” which correspond to a 
situation with the worst technology state (z
low) and the maximum level of reserves in the grid chosen in our 
computer implementation (Rt = 60 % of GDP). 
  Figure 2a should be compared with Figure 1a. It shows that the decision to default is the same for 
the cases “base” and “low technology.” The effect of holding reserves (“high reserves”) is to reduce the 
amount of sustainable debt. This is expected because reserve holdings reduce the cost of exclusion from the 
capital markets. Figure 2b is very similar to Figure 1b. It indicates that holding reserves reduces the next 
period level of debt. 
  Figures 2c and 2d show the decision to hold reserves in the next period when the sovereign has and 
does not have access to the capital markets, respectively. These figures are not particularly interesting, 
because most of the curves (precisely the “base” and “low technology” ones) coincide with the horizontal 
axis. The important result one draws from Figures 2c and 2d is that the sovereign chooses to hold low levels 
of reserves in the next period, whatever the state of the economy in this period. In particular, she decides to 
deplete her reserves holdings whenever her outstanding debt level is lower than 6.3% of GDP. Furthermore, 
and more interestingly, by jointly analyzing the “high reserves” curves from Figures 2b and 2c, one can see 
that the sovereign would tend to use her reserve holdings to repay part of her debt. 
  Calculating the invariant distribution of the states, we obtain that the sovereign is excluded from the 
market 1.29% of the time, the average debt is 46.0% of output, and the average reserve level is zero (see 
Table 2). Notice that the debt level and the frequency of default results are the same that we obtained in the 
economy without reserves. This is consistent with the fact that reserve holdings are equal to zero. 
  Indeed, the main lesson from this experiment is that it is optimal not to hold reserves at all. To 
appreciate the intuition behind this result, consider first the benefits and costs of holding reserves. As 
discussed before, the benefits of holding reserves are associated with the consumption smoothing they allow 
in case the country defaults. Reserve holding are also costly, as the sovereign impatience is higher than the   12
reserves remuneration. Or, in other words, in order to build its stock of reserves, an economy has to 
consume less. 
  But, more importantly, reserve holdings endogenously affect the willingness to default of the 
sovereign. As a consequence, reserve holdings reduce the amount of “sustainable” debt, or, more precisely, 
increases debt services for a given level of debt. Thus, reserve holdings make debt more costly to the 
sovereign. 
  Holding reserves may seem to be suboptimal because the sovereign can, instead, reduce the amount 
of outstanding debt. The idea here is that both reserve holdings and less outstanding debt are alternative 
ways of achieving consumption smoothing. In bad times, when the economy is hit by a bad output shock, in 
order to smooth consumption, the sovereign can increase the amount of debt to its maximum sustainable 
level. But in the case when the sovereign has outstanding debt levels lower than the maximum sustainable 
level, there is “more room” to borrow before debt becomes unsustainable. (More precisely, since default is 
less likely when outstanding debt is smaller, borrowing is relatively cheaper). 
  However, this logic is too simplistic for many reasons. First, reserves are a device to smooth 
consumption even after the country has defaulted, a circumstance in which the country cannot increase debt.  
Second, reserves affect the sovereign’s willingness-to-pay in complex ways. And, in particular, there is no 
reason for the amount of sustainable debt to vary linearly and uniformly with the amount of reserve 
holdings. In other words, there is no guarantee that reducing outstanding debt by, say, X dollars, increases 
the ability to smooth the same amount that holding X dollars as reserves does. Third, as Grossman and Han 
(1999) show, smoothing consumption through increasing debt is less effective than smoothing consumption 
through defaulting. Or, using their typology, “contingent service” generates more consumption smoothing 
than “contingent debt.” And since reserves are useful even after defaulting, they can be even more so when 
the sovereign opts to pay service contingently.  
  Taking all these together, one can conclude that there are many reasons why reserves holdings and 
less debt outstanding are not perfect substitutes. Consequently, it is not possible to say, a priori, that the 
optimal reserve holding is zero. Our result is, therefore, a quantitative one, which depends on the model and 
calibration.   13
4.3 Contagion 
  Is it always optimal to hold no reserves at all? The first robustness for this result we undertake is to 
consider the existence of “contagion effects,” or shocks to the international interest rate. The intuition here 
is that interest rate shocks may be an additional motivation to default on debt; debt services may become too 
costly to the sovereign. And, in as much as defaulting becomes a good alternative, holding reserves becomes 
a useful device to smooth consumption in the periods the sovereign is excluded from the international 
capital markets. 




















 (5’)   
where we now denote the risk free rate by both ρ
B and ρ
R.  This notation may initially appear awkward, as 
there should be only one rate. But, as we discuss next, this is a useful way to consider “irrational” contagion 
effects in the model. 
  We then assume that the risk free interest rate associated with the debt can take on of two values: ρ
B 
∈ {0.04, 0.20}. The low value corresponds to tranquil times and the high value to nervous times. We further 
assume that ρ
B evolves over time according to a Markov process. We calibrate the transition matrix that 
describes this process such that, on average, a contagion occurs every ten years and lasts for two years. This 
is in line with the stylized facts about sudden stops (see Edwards (2004) and Mendoza (2004)).  
  The idea of the model is that in nervous times there is some type of “irrational” contagion, which 
makes the emerging market face a high international rate, regardless of the risk of default. It is useful to 
remember that, in our model the probability of default is endogenously determined and affects the 
equilibrium bond price q
B even for a constant ρ
B. The occurrence of contagion is thus something else. It   14
represents a situation in which the emerging market faces a higher international rate even if it does not 
default.  
  Whereas the risk free rate associated with the debt oscillates, we assume the risk-free rate associated 
with reserves is constant and equal to ρ
R = 0.04. That is, the emerging markets always get the regular (and 
thus lower) interest rate remuneration on their reserves, and hence reserve accumulation does not benefit 
from the higher interest rates associated with contagion.   
In this specification, the state of the economy is defined by st = (Bt, Rt, zt, ρ
B
t). After solving for the 
equilibrium, we can again analyze the policy functions. Figures 3a and 3b depict the default and the next 
period of debt choices, and are analogous to Figures 2a and 2b. The curves “base,” “low technology,” and 
“high reserves” are defined as before, and refer to the case in which ρ
B = 0.04, that is, tranquil times. The 
additional curve, “high interest,” corresponds to the case with the worst technology shock, with the highest 
reserve holdings and with the high international interest rate ρ
B = 0.20. That is, this curve carries the same 
hypotheses of the curve labeled “high reserves” in addition to the interest rate shock or contagion 
assumptions. 
Notice that the results for the cases “base,” “low technology,” and “high reserves” are the same as 
before. The case “high interest” shows that contagion implies that the sovereign opts to default at smaller 
debt levels. This could imply more defaults, as one would have expected. However, at the same time, 
contagion implies an abrupt reduction in the amount of debt outstanding. Thus, it is not possible, by looking 
only at these figures, to know the true impact of contagion on the frequency of defaults. 
When we calculate the invariant distribution of the states, we obtain that the sovereign is excluded 
from the market only 0.52% of the time, the average debt is 25.1% of output, and the average reserve level 
is zero (see Table 2). Thus, contrary to our initial intuition, the sovereign optimally responds to the existence 
of contagion by reducing the outstanding debt and defaulting less frequently instead of defaulting more 
often. And, as a consequence, reserves again play no role. We chose not to report the decision of reserve 
holding (the analogs to curves 2c and 2d) because they do not add additional information. As before, it 
suffices to know that the sovereign opts to deplete her reserve holdings for any relevant state of the 
economy.   15
4.4 Sudden Stops 
  A pertinent criticism of our contagion experiment is that it fails to capture some of the most crucial 
characteristics of sudden stops. In particular, although we assumed sudden increases in the lending rate, we 
have not considered that there might be output costs associated with abrupt reversals in the current account 
(or, equivalently, sharp reduction of debt holdings). Maybe because of this, our solution pointed out that the 
sovereign would choose to reduce its debt holdings, instead of defaulting. 
  This criticism motivates us to modify the model and include exogenous output costs associated with 
sudden stops. This amounts to changing our equation (2) to 
  11 ( 1 ) e x p ( ) () ()
BR
tt t t t t t t cz B q B R q R ++ =− Δ − − + −  (2’) 
where Δ are the sudden-stop output costs. We set Δ = 10% if Bt+1 < Bt - 0.05, and Δ = 0 otherwise. By doing 
so, we are calibrating output costs equal to 10% every time there is a current account reversal greater than 
5% of GDP (see Calvo et al. (2006)). 
  Figures 4a and 4b are the analogs to figures 3a and 3c, once the sudden stop output costs are 
introduced in the model. Comparing Figure 4a with 3a, one notices that additional output costs associated 
with sudden stops reduce debt sustainability. The reason is such output costs reduce the benefits associated 
with the access to the international capital market, and thus make default more appealing. Figure 4b is 
surprising for the non-monotonicity of the policy functions, for which we do not have good intuition. But it 
reveals, as expected, that interest rate shocks do not imply in abrupt reductions of debt. 
  In line with these observations, the invariant distribution of the states (Table 2) reveals that the 
sudden-stop economy has more debt outstanding than the contagion economy (30.7% against 25.1% of GDP 
respectively), and is associated with more default episodes (1.54%). Noticeably, there are more defaults and 
less debt in the sudden-stop economy than in the benchmark economy. However, once again we obtained 
that reserve holdings are equal to zero. 
  We experimented with the sudden-stop economy using other parameters (higher output costs and 
smaller current account reversal tolerance), and obtained that the optimality of holding no reserves seems to 
be very robust to different calibrations. Our general reading of this experiment is that, in order to respond to   16
sudden-stop shocks, the sovereign does not increase the default frequency much but, instead, reduces the 
amount of outstanding debt (when compared to the “benchmark” economy outcomes). This, in turn, implies 
that sudden-stops are not quantitatively important to rationalize building a reserve buffer. 
4.5 Contingent Reserves 
  In a series of papers, Caballero advocates that emerging markets should hold contingent reserves.
14 
The intuition is fairly simple. Contingent reserves, which pay higher rates during “sudden stops,” should be 
better than non-contingent reserves since they allow for more consumption smoothing. The authors also 
describe the conditions for a contingent asset to qualify for this use (it cannot be controlled by the individual 
country, and its payoff has to be correlated with the occurrence of sudden stops) and quantify the gains from 
its use.
15 For the purpose of this paper, the possibility of holding contingent reserves should be seen as an 
additional reason to holding a reserve buffer, as it increases its benefits. 
  In order to simulate the existence of contingent reserves in our economy, we let the price of reserves 
take on two values: ρ
R ∈ {ρLOW, ρHIGH}. We also assume that there is a perfect correlation between ρ
R and 
ρ
B, that is, ρ
R = ρLOW when ρ
B = 0.04, and ρ
R = ρHIGH when ρ
B = 0.20. We keep the rest of the model and 
calibration identical to the sudden-stop economy. 
  The fact that international investors are risk neutral implies that there is a restriction on the values of 
ρLOW and ρHIGH. Since the expected value of the contingent reserves should be equal to the risk less interest 
rate, this pins down ρLOW for a given value of ρHIGH. In order to simulate the economy, we experiment for 
different values for ρHIGH. In fact, the choice of ρHIGH corresponds to different leverages, or different blends 
of contingent and non-contingent reserves. 
  However, regardless of the choice of ρHIGH, the result was the same and identical to the case with 
non-contingent reserves. That is, the invariant distribution results in the economy with contingent reserves 
are equal to those obtained with the sudden-stop economy in the previous subsection. The policy functions 
                                                 
14 See Caballero (2003) and Caballero and Panageas (2004). 
15 Caballero and Panageas (2004) have in mind concrete examples of instruments with contingent payoffs. However, 
more generally one can think that if capital outflows and sudden stops are associated with devaluations, the payoff of 
reserves (usually denominated in foreign currency) will be negatively correlated with these events.   17
obtained are also identical to those reported in figures 4a and 4b. The contribution of this experiment is that 
the benefits from contingent reserves are not quantitatively important enough to reverse to the previous 
result. Once again, the optimal reserve holding is zero. 
4.6 Output Costs Reduction 
Defaulting countries experience output costs beyond the observed reduction in investment and 
labor. Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005) find that additional output costs of defaulting are necessary to sustain the 
debt levels observed in emerging markets even in a model of contingent services.
16 Although these 
additional output losses are well documented, their micro-foundation remains to be understood. One 
possibility, pointed out by Dooley (2000), is that the loss in output is caused by the inability of debtors and 
creditors to quickly renegotiate contracts and the inability to condition the loss of output ex-ante by reasons 
of nonpayment.
 This creates a time interval during which residents of the country in default are unable to 
borrow from locals or foreigners, for example, due to the inability of new credits to be credibly senior to 
existing credits. If this is factually relevant, then reserves could potentially be used to mitigate the output 
costs of default. The empirical evidence provided by Frankel and Cavallo (2004) suggest that reserves may 
reduce output costs following a default.
17  
To investigate the possibility that this could affect our results, we analyze a case where reserves 
reduce output costs in an exogenous fashion. To implement this in the model, we change equation (3) to 
  1 2
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(1 )exp( ) ( )
1
R
tt t t t
t







Note that the output cost δ was substituted by the expression δ/(1 + ωRt
ω2
 ), where ω1 and ω2 are  
positive parameters and Rt is the level of reserves (measured in percentage of output). As our benchmark, 
we set ω1 = 100 and ω2 = 1, which implies that, when reserves amount to 10% of GDP, the costs from 
                                                 
16 As Grossman and Han (1999) point out, in contingent service models debt is sustainable even if the sovereign can 
save after defaulting and regardless the existence of additional output costs. 
17 Note that although there is a view that foreign reserves might reduce the probability of sudden stops, the overall 
empirical evidence on this relation is not conclusive (see Calvo et al. (2004), Edwards (2004), Frankel and Cavallo 
(2004) and Rodrik and Velasco (2000).   18
defaulting halves. We also experimented with ω2 < 1, for which the marginal reduction in the output cost of 
the first unit of reserves tends to infinity.
18 
From the solution of the model, we obtain again the policy functions for the default choice and the 
next period level of debt, which we depict in Figures 5a and 5b. The most noticeable change is that debt is 
now less sustainable than before, as one would expect. The invariant distribution points out to lower debt 
levels and fewer defaults (see Table 2). Once again, we obtain that reserve holdings are equal to zero. This 
was robust to all values of ω1 and ω2 we tried, including choices such as ω1 = 10000 and ω2 = .5. 
Paradoxically, as before, adding a new role for reserves implies in fewer defaults and, thus, no need for 
reserves. 
4.7 Discussion: Reserves as Collateral  
From the point of view of our framework, the main role of reserves is to act as a buffer stock, useful 
for consumption smoothing even when the sovereign is excluded from capital markets. As we discussed, 
and the quantitative exercises show, according to this view, reserve holdings are consistent with less debt 
sustainability. A completely different view, sometimes advanced in the literature, is that reserves can be 
used as collateral, thus increasing debt sustainability.   
But can reserves really be used as collateral? Our view is that this role, if it exists, is at best very 
limited. Reserves are legally protected against attachment by creditors. Under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976 of the United States and similar laws in other countries, central bank assets, 
including international reserves, are usually protected against attachment.
19 Hence, reserves work as 
collateral only in the case where governments willingly, and more importantly credibly, pledge them as 
such.
20 Most governments, however, are generally careful to keep their reserve assets untouchable, thus 
limiting their role as collateral. As Eaton et al. (1986) note, “if the collateral is retained in the borrowing 
                                                 
18 We thank Joshua Aizenman for this suggestion. 
19 This is also the case even when the central bank is the issuer of the debt. The Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) in Switzerland is also protected against attachment proceedings; governments and central banks in many cases 
place assets with the BIS. This, however, is not the case in Germany, where under German law, reserves are open for 
attachment.  See Scott (2005) and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006). 
20 Reserves, however, can affect the bargaining position of a country in a negotiation. See Detragiache (1996) for a 
bargaining model that incorporates reserves along these lines.    19
country, there is no mechanism by which the creditor can seize it, and if the collateral is moved outside the 
country, where the creditor can seize it, the value of the loan is effectively reduced by the value of the 
collateral. A fully and effectively collateralized loan would then be of no value to the borrower.” 
5.  Conclusions 
  On the one hand, reserve accumulation is costly because it implies in less current consumption. On 
the other hand, holding reserves may be beneficial. Reserves can be used to smooth consumption when a 
country (i) is excluded from capital markets after defaulting, (ii) is hit by “irrationally” high interest rates 
due to international contagion, or (iii) suffers from a so-called “sudden-stop” phenomenon. In addition, 
reserves may be particularly useful (iv) if their payoff is contingent on the state of nature, or (v) if they can 
mitigate the output costs associated with a default. 
  We study the optimal reserve policy in a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model which is 
calibrated to match a typical emerging market economy. The model is general enough to contemplate the 
potential benefits of reserves mentioned above and, importantly, endogenously determine the optimal debt 
level. We obtain that the optimal policy is not to hold reserves at all.  
To obtain our results we resorted to many simplifications. In particular we acknowledge the lack of 
micro foundations related to the sudden stop phenomenon. More generally, why countries hold debt remains 
to be understood in the literature. We believe that a better understanding of these issues could improve the 
analysis, but we do not expect that doing so would change our results qualitatively in terms of the 
desirability of reducing the amount of outstanding debt as opposed to increasing reserves. 
Overall, our paper contributes to the existing debate by arguing that current reserve holding do not 
seem to correspond to the optimal behavior of a sovereign that can both choose the levels of debt and hold 
reserves. Some form of transaction costs, which were not considered in our model, could rationalize 
countries holding some small amount of reserves, say, to cover for their very short-term debt. But this 
cannot account for large reserve stocks. We believe the recent reserve accumulation observed in emerging 
markets is better explained by political economy reasons. Exploring these rationales further is an important 
topic for future research.   20
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 Table 1: Calibration of Benchmark Model 
Technology autocorrelation  α = 0.85 
Technology standard deviation           σε = 0.044 
Probability of redemption  θ = 0.50 
Output costs  δ = 0.10 
Risk aversion  σ = 2.00 
Risk free interest rate  ρ = 0.04 




















No Reserves  1.29  46.0  0  0 
Benchmark 1.29  46.0  0  0 
Contagion 0.52  25.1  0  0 
Sudden-Stops 1.54  30.7  0  0 
Contingent Reserves  1.54  30.7  0  0 
Output Reduction  0.54  28.7  0  0 
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Figure 1a: Default Decision in the “No Reserves” Economy 
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Figure 2a: Default Decision in the “Benchmark” Economy 
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Figure 3a: Default Decision in the “Contagion” Economy 
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Figure 4a: Default Decision in the “Sudden-Stop” Economy 
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Figure 5a: Default Decision in the “Output Reduction” Economy 
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